Bridging the strategic gap: new strategies in post conflict management. A within-case and across-case study of security sector reform and rule of law institution building in post conflict states by Kleponis, W. Gregory
THE UNIVERSITY OF BOLTON 
 
 
 
 
BRIDGING THE STRATEGIC GAP: NEW 
STRATEGIES IN POST CONFLICT 
MANAGEMENT 
A Within-Case and Across-Case Study of Security Sector Reform and 
Rule of Law Institution Building in Post Conflict States  
 
W. GREGORY KLEPONIS 
 
B.A.  Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania, 1985 
M.A. Norwich University, 2010 
L.L.M. University of London, 2015 
Ph.D. (Candidate) University of Bolton 2018 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Through 
Practice  in International Conflict Studies in the School of Law, University of Bolton 
1 
 
 
Declaration 
The author, Walter Gregory Kleponis, declares the papers mentioned herein is his own work 
based on his prior published papers. All papers presented in evidence in support of this Critical 
Appraisal were works of sole authorship.  The author acknowledges the materials and references 
duly used or cited in the papers. The usual disclaimers apply.  
 
 
 
 
 
Walter Gregory Kleponis 
3 June 2018 
2 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Over the course of the last half century, it is commonly understood that the nature of warfare has 
changed dramatically. New ways to engage in what is known as the operational art have been 
devised and through a mixture of strategic and tactical approaches to waging war, combined with 
emerging technologies have dramatically changed the nature of warfare. While waging war has 
in some ways become significantly more efficient, sadly however “waging the peace” in the 
aftermath of war has been, to the experience of many states, decidedly less so. 
Conflicts, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the US and its coalition partners 
intervened and removed governments they deemed pernicious, are clear examples of the attempt 
to reform and to build new institutions and systems viewed as acceptable. Sadly however, by 
nearly every International governance standard and institutional metric they have largely failed.  
Despite billions of dollars in assistance from the international community, these countries even 
now, with continuous international assistance, struggle to manage their economies and political 
systems after over a decade on their own.  This failure has not been due to a wholesale lack of 
will on the interveners. Certainly, as previously mentioned, there has been a seemingly endless 
supply of aid. While there have been the challenges of intra-state violence, dysfunctional 
political parties at odds with one another, institutional failures and endemic corruption, they do 
not alone explain the frustratingly slow pace of progress. The challenges listed above are merely 
the symptoms of dysfunction. The real failures can rather be traced to a lack of foresight in 
planning, lack of cross culture competence and awareness and the inability to understand the 
history, culture and religion of the country. These three key elements of any society are 
essentially the animating force of the people.  A failure to assess what role they play in post-
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crisis environments and the institutions that develop in them will set the conditions for slow 
progress, passive and active resistance from local partners, loss of trust and hope of the people 
and the emboldening of violence among opposition groups both inside and outside the borders. 
This work describes in an overarching way, using the various published works with specific 
examples, of how important it is to design institutional systems and processes that are built 
around the foundational elements of society. The work describes an end to end methodology of 
integrated, operational tools for analysis, planning, operating and assessing change in complex 
human adaptive conflict-affected operating environments. These are largely in the Middle East 
and South Asian Cultural context, where the animating elements of history, religion and cultural 
practice will inform everything we as post conflict, post crisis practitioners and policy makers 
do. 
The papers themselves address several of these elements or “real-life” examples of using 
the transforming conflict systems analytical tool toward solving both macro as well as micro 
institutional problems. These examples provide examples where there is a mis-match in policy 
and program objectives with the cultural, normative or human dimensions. Other papers address 
the aspects of Coalition Forces holding nationals of those state that are not only contradict 
International Law, but violate existing historical or cultural norms and  further disrupting already 
conflictual societies. Other works examine the effect of corruption, its basis in culture and efforts 
on political and social development.  
Lastly, the remainder of the works address the introduction of what I will refer to hereon 
as the intervening forces (US, Coalition,) and the local population. Interveners need to recognize, 
identify and mitigate the shortfalls in order to Bridge the Strategic Gap in policy.   
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this Critical Appraisal is to introduce and evaluate the ideas, concepts of the 
published works that are within the field of post conflict studies. The works are dedicated to the 
analysis of military occupation law1 and the Rule of Law reform2 in transitioning societies, 
democratic peace-building, security sector reform (SSR)3, and cross-cultural awareness when 
building institutional structures, as well as the cross cultural competency4 of those practitioners 
working by, with and through local social, religious and political leaders in the attempt to 
achieve stable and functioning post conflict societies. The works presented and being examined 
were written based not only a great deal of scholarly inquiry, but also  by the personal experience 
of the author in post conflict societies engaged in an array of Security Sector Reform (SSR) and 
Rule of Law reform programs spanning nearly 10 years. This unique and personal experience 
and participation hopefully adds a measure of authenticity and rare insight into the subjects 
explored and provides first-hand commentary that underscores and lends credence to theory. It 
                                                     
1 While there is no definition as such in this term is taken to mean the Rule of Law and the establishment of legal 
systems in post conflict settings beginning with and after which there has been a military occupation.  Many of the 
terms used in the published works are those of the author’s invention and add to the Kleponis lexicon used in the 
Kleponis Model of Post Conflict Management Conflict System Transformation. 
2 Rule  of Law Reform in the context of post conflict reconstruction is an overarching term used to describe the 
policies and programs put in place to amend or reform the legal system by analysing existing legal structures, 
advocating and implementing changes in order to develop justice, transparency and efficiency to a reformed 
government- in this case law supporting democratic regimes.   
3 Security Sector Reform (SSR) encompasses the reformation and building of the network of security institutions 
that contribute to creating the enabling conditions of stability and security for the population so that the 
government and economy can effectively function.  
4 Cross Cultural Competency is a social-anthropological term to describe the awareness of the nuances of other 
cultures as well as and importantly one’s own culture when assessing what influences are and are not appropriate 
to achieve goals consistent with the local cultural norms  
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should be noted that this is an emerging field of study and thus a rich area for research 
exploitation and new theories.  Terms and interpretations are being developed each year as 
experiences over the past 15 plus years are assessed, synthesized into the existing body of 
knowledge and introduced to provide a basis for even newer theory.  
      In conclusion, the published works being appraised all possess some element of analysis of 
the importance and effect of cross-cultural competency in those developing and administering 
reconstruction programs. Certain projects are evaluated on their efficacy with a focus on how 
effective the actual practitioners were in developing “buy in” from local leaders and officials and 
with an eye toward the “how” in which they were constructed. Finally, an examination into the 
role of ethnocentrism in the origination of systems and processes during the assessment phase of 
post conflict program design is critical in the prediction and indeed evaluation of the success of 
programs and institutions. 
18 
 
CHAPTER 2: CONTEXT OF THE STUDY   
     Before moving forward onto specific scrutiny of the published works and their relevance to 
the theory and practice of peace-building, security sector reform, institutional development and 
promoting democratic values, a brief discursive journey through the events and circumstances of 
the latter part of the 20th century and first two decades of the 21st century are instructive. This is 
done in order to provide a contextual understanding of the paradigm shift in conflict which has 
resulted in a whole new school of thought and theory surrounding conflict and to which these 
works are devoted. 
The demise of the Soviet Union in the last decade of the 20th century and the subsequent 
loss of a bi-polar world have had profound and long lasting effects on the traditional balance of 
power paradigms, the shift from interstate to largely intrastate conflict, failed and failing states 
and transnational terrorism.  “A grim history attends the rise of this new post--conflict 
technocracy. On one hand, the end of a bipolar geopolitical order marked by the fall of the 
Soviet Union influenced the cessation of a number of long-- standing conflicts. On the other 
hand, the end of global bipolarity has led to the efflorescence of violent struggles, and these have 
challenged both the perceptions of, and responses to, old and seemingly new repertoires of peace 
and violence.” (Monk, 2014 p18) What has evolved in its stead is a movement from interstate 
dominated Realist Balance of Power5 conflicts that characterized the late 19th century and much 
                                                     
5 The balance of power theory in international relations suggests that national security is enhanced when military 
capability is distributed so that no one state is strong enough to dominate all others. Late 20th century in particular 
was marked by a bi-polar balance of power paradigm between the US/NATO and the Soviet Union/Warsaw PACT 
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of the 20th centuries to a post -Westphalian6 regionally focused often intra-state conflict 
paradigm revolving around resources competition, religious ideologies, ethnicities and sects.  
During the 1990s much of the world stood by while genocide and ethnic cleansing occurred in 
Africa and intervened to a limited degree in the Balkans.  “With respect to the so-- called new 
wars, it is important to note that the 1990s witnessed the outbreak of a significant number of 
conflicts. Iraq, Somalia, Yugoslavia, Haiti, Rwanda, Algeria, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, Chechnya, 
East Timor— to - name just a few horrors— - loom large in histories of post-- conflict peace-
building -not only because a number of these conflicts presented the international community 
with a persistent “intervention dilemma” during the hostilities, but because their cessation posed 
even larger challenges to established conventions of peace-keeping.” (Monk, 2014, p 22)   
Events in 2001 changed much as the US and the West re-focused on terrorism and the methods 
to fight stateless international actors7. Intervention became more of a truly considered and indeed 
acted upon option in a post 9/11 world.          Conflict around the globe which had been shifting 
toward the end of the 20th century had nearly completed its shift from conflicts between and 
among states to conflicts between parties within states.    
By 2012, the overwhelming majority (31 of 32 or 97%) of the world’s armed conflicts 
were internal civil wars (Themner and Wallensteen 2013, 510). Of these, one in four involved an 
external state providing security assistance in the form of troops and related support to or more 
                                                     
6 Refers to a system of interactions between states and non-state actors that does not conform to the condition of 
the relationship of sovereign nations characterized by the time since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.  The “post-
Westphalian” era is one where international organizations and other non-state actors are subsuming the roles 
ordinarily filled by independent sovereign nations.  
7 Term used to refer to transnational terrorist groups, international organized crime syndicates or what are known 
as super empowered individuals. All of these groups can wield influence through violence and crime subscribing 
and giving allegiance to any particular organized state as such.  
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warring parties.  These statistics are part of a longer, unprecedented trend of foreign involvement 
in civil wars dating back to the end of Second World War (2013, 510). In the last two decades, 
more than 20 internal conflicts involved peace or post conflict interventions designed to prevent 
a resumption of violence and to strengthen or reconstruct state institutions (Paris and Sisk 2009c, 
1-2). Conflict, and conflict management have changed enormously as have the means and 
methods in which they are dealt with. The works that I introduce and appraise specifically deal 
with the “what” that comes after the intervention.  
The field of post-conflict management (aka, nation-building, peace-building and post 
conflict reconstruction)8 has thus far been an under researched field of study. In fact if one looks 
at the terms used to reference this “phase”9  (as shown in Figure 1), it is clear that a proper set of 
agreed upon terms is yet to be universally applied.  This are of research represents  a relatively 
new area of study  and marks an evolutionary period in this discipline . It is for this reason that 
scholars  have ample opportunity to research, understand and interpret and most importantly 
bring to light the multitude of phenomenon that confront intervening powers at the cessation of 
active, and I might add, intentional and expected hostilities10,  a period during which those same 
forces will need to transition to civil activities.  As shown below (Figure 1), the phases of 
                                                     
8 These terms while not ordinarily used interchangeably have roughly the same meaning and can refer to the 
varying disciplines of post conflict policies, practices and programs.   
9  “Phase” is used in this context referring to the US Army’s Phases of Warfare Structure. These phases shown in 
figure 1 depict the stages of war as they progress linearly through time. After the so called “kinetic” phases come 
the post conflict stabilizing and shaping phases which are part of post conflict management. 
10  I use this term as it is important to distinguish those military operations and activities that the intervening forces 
understood to be the usual and customary by products of warfare. Other hostilities or those possibly unexpected 
or unplanned for are those hostilities that occur as a part of insurgency, terrorism or civil war. Many of which may 
take place at the same time that civil construction operations are underway.   
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military operations contain some early elements of civil stabilization planning and 
implementation across the whole spectrum thus the post conflict reconstruction process remains 
a constant element of the engagement. The focus of this and the publications being assessed pay 
particular attention to the top tier of the chart containing the Phases IV and V. It is in these areas 
that real “change planning” is crucial in transforming conflict systems. 
 
Figure 1 
Source: National Academic Press 
 
 
      Figure 1 shows the phases of full spectrum operations that intervention forces pass through 
during a full scale intervention and will be discussed more fully in the Transforming Post 
Conflict Systems Model.  
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    The increase of state disruptions, internal conflicts and civil war increases volatility in 
what is already considered to be an anarchic multipolar system and will likely be the main 
feature of conflict in the 21st century. We now recognize the threats that turbulence in less 
developed societies endure and the terrorism they create and export, are a global threat and that 
nations will likely intervene in failed or failing states in the future for a variety of reasons. There 
is also a growing understanding that we can no longer afford to view terrorist violence solely 
within the context of the individual actors or groups but also and equally within the context of 
terrorism’s root causes which are the economic and political failures of weak states. In order to 
counter these states will have to intervene either militarily, economically or socially to counter 
these effects. The study of this phenomenon and the better understanding of it therefore must be 
absorbed into the literature and policy guidance that post conflict managers rely on.   
     Chester Crocker, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Walsh School of Foreign Service, 
Georgetown University,11 claims that a key challenge going forward is deciding whether 
powerful states and international organizations have the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)12 – that 
is to say intervene in failing states. Additionally if they do have that responsibility, can they 
simultaneously provide security against insurgents and/or terrorists and simultaneously execute 
                                                     
11 Crocker was also the serving US Ambassador to Iraq 2006-2008. He and General Petraeus (Architect of the 
“Surge”) described, in a description borrowed from this author, trying to engage in rebuilding a war-torn society 
while fighting an insurgency as “trying to fly an airplane while you are still building it.” He used this phrase in 
Congressional Testimony in September 2010.  Term was also used by the Author Bob Woodward in his book, The 
War Within: A Secret White House History 2006-2008 
 
12 The Responsibility to Protect (R2P or RtoP) is a global political commitment which was endorsed by all member 
states of the United Nations at the 2005 World Summit in order to address its four key concerns to prevent 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. 
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conflict management policies in zones of conflict? “The 1990s dilemmas of humanitarian 
intervention and peacemaking are now joined by increasingly salient questions about how to 
effectively pursue nation building and democratization processes in states that are internally 
divided, capacity deficient and conflict ridden.” (Crocker, p.4) What Crocker is asking is really 
the existential question for conflict management in the 21st century which begs the further 
question of the “how” do states who have decided to intervene design programs, institutions and 
policies that are compatible for the “intervened?”  
The war on terrorism and the consequences of US-led interventions in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have changed the global playing field in a serious way. Contemporary examples of 
US operations to remove despots and rid countries of pernicious quasi-governments, such as the 
Taliban that support terror, have highlighted the limited effectiveness of military power and the 
emphasis that must be placed on developing both specific methods and dedicated organizations 
to help restore order and rebuild shattered societies.  
   Questions such as; what existing national institutions and resources can be marshaled to 
help transitioning societies, give way to more questions such as, what kind of institutions, 
organizations and command structures need to be created to lessen the burden on a military 
whose power projection capabilities may be heavily taxed by strategic commitments as was seen 
in both in Iraq and Afghanistan. If however, military forces will be called upon to take up a 
central role in post conflict management and reconstruction, new frameworks, process designs 
and models must be introduced into the critical skill sets of these forces.  “Early on in 
interventions in failing states, intervening forces typically realise that their challenge outstrips 
their governments’ political will and begin looking for shortcuts. The ‘breathtakingly 
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mechanistic’ approach that results appears to be premised on a belief that if they spend enough 
money on politically uncontroversial, technocratic steps to strengthen the apparatus for 
administering the system (or systems) of justice, this modest investment will be repaid with most 
of the virtues we associate with the rule of law in civil, stable societies.”  (Mason, 2011, p14) 
Centrally,  these published works address  why today’s military leaders must be a part of this 
process of redefining the application of national power and should develop capabilities that are 
built on end to end methodologies, and utilizing  integrated, operationally proven tools for 
analysis, planning, operating and assessing change in complex human adaptive conflict-affected 
environments.  
Rule of Law Development and Security Sector Reform – Their Origins 
 
Nation building and reconstruction have existed in various programmatic states since the 
end of the Second World War.  “The Rule of Law Reform programming that has evolved over the 
last 20 years should be distinguished from the Law and Development13 phase that preceded it in 
the 1960’s and 1970’s” (Samuels, p1).  The latter was mostly a US undertaking, funded 
primarily by USAID and The Ford Foundation, as well as relying on the expertise of US 
academics at major US law schools.  The programming aimed to reform the judicial systems and 
the legal systems of many countries throughout the developing world to assist in their economic 
development or so it was believed. These ambitious projects relied on the belief that legal 
changes would engender social changes and that the US legal system was the best model to 
                                                     
13 Law and development is an interdisciplinary study of law and economic and social development. It examines the 
relation between law and development and analyzes how to use law as an instrument to promote economic 
development, democracy and human rights. Largely an approach used in the 1960’s and 1970’s it has largely been 
discredited and abandoned.  
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support economic development. The movement was declared to be a failure in the mid-seventies 
by its key supporters. Criticism of the programming included that it was not based on a theory of 
how law impacted on development, that there was no local ownership of the projects, that the 
focus was entirely on the formal legal system (ignoring the traditional or informal mechanisms), 
and finally (and this is the most important point)…..”that it relied on the ethnocentric view that 
the American legal system could be successfully transplanted into the developing world.” 
(Samuels, p.1)  Part of the problem emanates from the practice of IGOs and Western aid 
agencies to advance “institution and capacity-building” as the primary means by which the rule 
of law may be established or strengthened in post-conflict situations. “This approach is 
principally one of institutional enforcement, based around state-sanctioned enforcement 
structures such as arrest, detention and prosecution mechanisms’ This approach derives from 
understanding the rule of law as an appliance rather than a way of interacting. Policymakers 
find it congenial to imagine the rule of law as a collection of things that can be imported 
wholesale because that relieves them of the much more daunting challenge of tinkering with the 
myriad and nebulous arrays of incentives people in the society have for treating one another 
civilly or otherwise.” (Mason, 2011 p33).   
The current Rule of Law reform programming is a more International phenomenon, 
supported by a far greater number of agencies and countries, and is rationalized on the basis of 
economic development, democracy, and peace. While the approach taken in contemporary 
settings is more comprehensive, integrated and nuanced, it does however need to revisit some of 
the lessons learned from the previous Law and Development model as practitioners may have 
lapsed back into the older failed approach. This “lessons learned” approach to like do much “to 
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disabuse practitioners of belief in political alchemy – or convince them of the folly of operating 
as if they had this belief – and to develop a more nuanced, sophisticated understanding of the 
rule of law as a state of affairs in which people feel it makes sense for them to act within the 
law.” (Mason, 2011 p27) 
    Security Sector Reform (SSR), or elements of it, is a more specific and recurrent theme in 
these published works. One might consider it a sub-set of Rule of Law Reform.  Broadly 
conceived, SSR entails all policies, programs and activities aimed “to create a secure 
environment that is conducive to development, poverty reduction, and democracy.” (OECD, 
2005,16). Building and often times, reforming, security institutions into more accountable,  
public service oriented and humane organizations is now a central feature of post conflict 
management and peace peace-building efforts.  SSR begins with the assumption that security and 
development are inseparable (Collier et al. 2003).  The notion that establishing a secure 
environment through the building of reliable security services provides the entry point for 
development underpins nearly all aspects of reconstruction thinking. Regrettably, the 
International community’s experience with SSR has, at least in the latest conflicts, not been 
overly successful. There are various reasons for this, which are examined in the works reviewed.  
   The Rule of Law Reform,14 as well as the establishment of functioning, accountable legal 
systems is also one of the key enabling elements for stability in Post-Conflict Management 
Theory. The Rule of Law, such that it is credible and respected by the population, is an enabling 
factor for the growth of the economy as transactional and property laws become codified, 
                                                     
14 Rule of Law reform is a term that covers a range of initiatives and projects, means different things to different 
organizations, and has ranged in content and focus over time.  
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transparent and enforced. This “Social Contract”15 is a natural function of governance or systems 
of authority. All cultures have unique systems of authority where they are state, non-state, tribal, 
civic, religious, corporate or otherwise--- ultimately premised on mutual consent of those with 
authority and those subject to authority in that system. The creation of a transparent and fair 
criminal justice system also assists the transition in demonstrating to the public that the 
government is not only concerned with security and safety but with fairness.  The challenge put 
to post conflict practitioners and policy makers is not only how to develop the various systems 
but also more importantly, what context they are creating them in. Legal systems, much like 
laws, are many and varied and arise due to the peculiar and unique historical, political and 
religious circumstances of the cultures from which they come. It is important to note that 
authority systems can originate from a combination of sources and most importantly 
“governance” is not even synonymous with government. Governments are only one system of 
authority and frankly not even the most common systems. In the two states in which I focus my 
writing, governance is sited both within government but also influenced and informed heavily by 
religion and kin affiliations such as tribes or clans.  Post-Conflict practitioners and others in the 
international community seem to have in many instances, missed those key points when 
developing constitutions and the legal systems that flow from them to their client states. This has 
been met with confusion, inefficiency in implementation and, in some cases, direct institutional 
push-back from the client state. This has happened because  the “new” and in some cases “alien” 
systems are not fully understood by the population and looked upon with suspicion.  The 
                                                     
15  Social contract is both a moral and political philosophy. The actual theory originated during the 17th century and 
concerns the origin of society and the legitimacy of authority of the state of the individual. This theory establishes 
that the individual grants the state this authority in exchange for other public goods thus the state rules with the 
“consent of the governed.” 
28 
 
international community should comprehend the importance of the context of the law and legal 
traditions of the client state and understand that some legal practices and traditions that originate 
from Western European traditions simply do not travel well to other cultures.  
     In the published works I have also discussed the economic factors in terms of the causes of 
conflict. It begs the question however of what are the economic considerations for stability and 
reconstruction and how are those conditions created? How important is establishing a firm 
economic base and lifting segments of the population out of poverty? Is the emphasis on 
democracy the priority? Is it the development of the economy?  This is a sort of classic “Chicken 
– Egg” question. In fact it is the fundamental conundrum facing policy makers in post conflict 
states. In nearly each instance of intervention the focus has been political development with scant 
attention paid to the economy. In each case the people felt that they were generally not better off 
because of the the intervention. Perhaps either a focus on developing the economy first or at a 
minimum, a dual focus is indicated based on the less than impressive results over the past 16 
years in only two but very large and important interventions. The other axiom of post conflict 
and stability operations must also be questioned. This is that economic development cannot take 
place in the absence of a secure environment; at the same time, can a secure environment be long 
sustained without progress in economic development?  
The International communities’ strategy has relied heavily on the establishment of 
democratic systems in states such as Afghanistan and Iraq. In these two examples this has been  
met with mixed success.  Can it be assessed that there is currently a shift in emphasis away from 
Democracy as the ultimate end state which defines success? I am developing a sense that 
democracy as an ultimate objective, has declined somewhat as a primary objective. This begs the 
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question of whether democracy equals success in all instances. Can we define success and 
establish security and relationships with non-democratic states?  
      Since WWII, it has more or less become axiomatic that democracy is the only type of 
political structure that can help heal the wounds of a fractured society.   It has become almost 
conventional wisdom that democracy is good for all countries and all peoples all of the time. 
Democratic Peace theorists16 argue that the establishment of democracy makes possible all other 
successful aspects of society including free and open trade markets, human rights guarantees and 
overall good behavior and good global citizenry.  While this may sound noble and indeed be 
noble through the lens of post-Lockean, liberal Western Democratic theory, the opposite seems 
to be the case in many non-western traditional societies.  Not only has the truth been that most of 
the Western Industrial Democracies have tried to institute democracy to encourage the transition 
from authoritarian post conflict countries with unintended consequence, it has also unfortunately 
taken on a somewhat coercive quality. “Stakeholders in the peace-building paradigm derive 
epistemic legitimacy for institutionalization— as ­ have “nation builders” like George W. Bush— 
from ­ what is commonly referred to as the “Democratic Peace” paradigm. Drawing upon a 
tradition of political research that has claimed (largely on normative or institutionalist grounds) 
that democracies tend not to wage war on other democracies, liberal peace-builders 
…..engineered the same democratic peace into a program of action.  The problem, as peace-
builders themselves frame it, is that a liberal project is advanced through illiberal means. “The 
governance of post-- conflict territories by the United Nations embodies a central policy 
                                                     
16 Democratic peace theory is a theory which posits that democracies are hesitant to engage in armed conflict with 
other identified democracies. In contrast to theories explaining war engagement, it is a "theory of peace" outlining 
motives that dissuade state-sponsored violence. A corollary  
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dilemma,” Simon Chesterman argues. “[H]ow does 
one help a population prepare for democratic 
governance and the rule of law by imposing a form 
of benevolent autocracy?”  With some variations, 
stakeholders and advocates of the liberal peace-
building paradigm have, like Chesterman, suggested 
that the paradox of undemocratic democratization is an irreducible feature of peace transitions. 
It is, in other words, a necessary evil to be mitigated by introducing forms of “accountability and 
consultation” into transitional administrations, and by inviting local populations to become 
stakeholders “in the creation of . . . [political] structures, and in the process by which power is 
transferred.”  (Monk 2014)  
     While the Le Monde cartoon (above) is hardly fair and misses the noble intentions of freeing 
the Iraqis (in this case) from the yoke of a despot, it does however demonstrate how, in some 
corners of the world, democracy is perhaps not as appreciated as we might think and the efforts 
of Western powers and their motives are viewed with suspicion not only in the Middle East and 
South Asia but in many parts of Africa. The other unintentional consequence of democracy is of 
the “winner takes all” aspect of pure democracy. In states where there are ethnic, religious or 
sectarian minorities, the idea of “the majority rules” can result in sinister consequences. One of 
the existential questions students of Conflict and Conflict management must consider and 
evaluate is whether or not democracy is part of the prescription to cure what ails some societies 
or is it going to accelerate an already fractured society toward intra-state violence?  Democracy 
is from its very nature chaotic and conflictual. Overlaying inherently chaotic and conflictual 
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political systems on already chaotic and conflictual societies may not in the end yield peaceful 
and equitable results. As E. D Patterson points out, “……. the West has been flabbergasted by 
the persistence of war because we cherish the idea that democracy and capitalism— in other 
words, human liberty—is the answer.” While many in the international community may value 
these inherent “goods” others in the post-conflict environments may not share them as General 
Petraeus famously said about the insurgent groups in Iraq, “The enemy gets a vote too.” 
      Marina Ottaway, Director of the Middle East Program for the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, presents a thought provoking perspective on Democratic Peace Theory. Here 
are a few considerations she offers: The first is that there is a growing body of evidence that 
suggests that coercive democratization is not a successful strategy in most post conflict 
situations. Democracy can be developed only in well-established states, capable of exercising 
authority over their ENTIRE territory. Secondly, democracy, and in particular  the majoritarian 
democracy, to which the international community appears committed, also requires a population 
that shares a common identity not one deeply fragmented along lines of ethnicity and religion. 
Neither of these characteristics is common in countries emerging from civil war or intra-state 
conflicts.  Therefore the idea that democracy is the one size fits all solution in a post conflict 
situation needs to be discarded and a wider range of alternative solutions, such as temporary or 
transitional solutions should be considered. Ottaway suggests that governments of national unity 
should be promoted rather than pushing for the immediate adoption of competitive and divisive 
democratic systems. Lastly, democracy is inherently conflictual, messy and probably 
inappropriate for use in fragile societies transitioning from authoritarian to democratic or freer 
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systems (Ottway, 4).  Democracy as Ralf Dahrendorf17  has pointed out is “government by 
conflict”.  In other words it is a political system that recognizes there can never be unanimity of 
interests and views in a society and therefore creates mechanisms to institutionalize conflict and 
manage it.  Clearly, if considered in this context, we might reconsider the immediate drive 
toward establishing democracies in societies with no historical point of reference for same. The 
examples of both Iraq and Afghanistan in this regard are particularly compelling. Both countries 
were examples of the notion that somehow overlaying arguably the most conflictual 
governmental system of some of the most inherently conflictual societies would create peace and 
stability was born out of a kind of idealistic view of the power of democracy as a force of good 
that ended with a cognitive dissonance among leaders when confronted with the abject failure 
and resulting violence of having done so.  
Leaders should study the effects of democratization, in particular, coercive 
democratization. I use the word coercive not in the classic sense but more in suggesting that 
client states who rely almost wholly on financial aid and other forms of support from the 
Western states feel they have little choice in the authorship of their new governance structures. 
The pressure to conform to the development of new institutions formulated on Western traditions 
and values is significant and often irresistible. Engineering democracy cuts across financial 
resources, international agencies, Rule of Law and control of sovereign territory. Policy makers, 
practitioners and students of post conflict transition should consider new alternatives to pure 
democracy in transitional post-conflict societies. The collected works presented offer new 
strategies and the theories that underpin them based on over a decade of personal empirical 
                                                     
17            German-British sociologist, philosopher, political scientist and liberal politician. A class conflict  
theorist, Dahrendorf was a leading expert on explaining and analyzing class divisions in modern society. 
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research in two examples of post-conflict transitional societies. Throughout the presented works, 
references are made toward post- conflict redevelopment policy, the building of institutions and 
the approach to the Rule of Law once again predicated on traditional authority structures, 
cultural practices and religious belief systems. In each, I cite the importance of the respective 
roles of history, religion and culture as a guide to how the particular society has been habitually 
organized. In the cases of societies that I personally studied/peer-observed in the field, as well as 
discussed in my published works, I have tried to link the failure to understand and appreciate 
these influences on those societies and the failures that resulted by operating in ignorance of 
them. The role of history for example is important because most societies are guided quite 
strongly by their history and collective cultural memories. Friedrich Nietzche, the 19th century 
German Philologist, understood the power of historical context on present day political discourse 
and direction on society. He said, “that for the health of a single individual, a people, and a 
culture the unhistorical and the historical are equally essential.” (Nietzche, 2004) In this he 
meant that the history of these cultures was vitally important but one can also infer that he 
equally meant folklore. Both Iraq and Afghanistan have long histories with the West and their 
societies have equally long memories. It is not to be ignored that during the invasions of 
Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003 respectively that there were living members of those 
societies that were literally alive when for the example the British had last fought in their 
country. Both countries have had a history of Imperialism and Empire and both had successfully 
moved beyond that with the memories still fresh in their collective memories. Churchill once 
described the Afghans this way….. . “Every family cultivates its vendetta; every clan, its feud.... 
Nothing is ever forgotten and very few debts are left unpaid." (Churchill, 1996) 
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      Religion, particularly among Muslim cultures is the animating force in both their public 
and private lives. It is not only the animating force that informs the way they think and believe 
according to the Koran, but also informs the way they behave. Religion informs Law in Islam 
and Muslims abide by Shar’ia in the way they view legal disputes and justice. The legal 
strictures of the Koran with particular attention paid to justice are anathema to Western Justice 
Systems and Western Culture altogether. The idea that supplanting a Western Corpus Juris 
Civilis18 based legal tradition on an eastern culture without accommodation to the Koran, 
Haditha or Sunnas is folly and was bound not to be accepted by the society. Indeed by accepting 
a non-Shar’ia based system they are in direct violation of the common principles that underpin 
their entire societal construct.  While Shar’ia does not account for complex contract law, 
international law and various other types of judicial conflict resolution, it does an excellent job 
(as far as the people are concerned) with meeting the needs of local, communal and domestic 
interpretations. Constructing hybrid systems such as what is found in Egypt may have been a 
more suitable model in both countries which blends both international, Civil and Shar’ia as each 
is need in its appropriate realm.  
      Lastly, culture is informed by the previous two and is a culmination of customs, attitudes 
and beliefs that distinguish one group of people from another. It is the distilled essence of the 
people and that very thing that creates the mental maps in the people with whom the Post 
Conflict Specialist must deal.  
                                                     
18     The original body of Roman or civil law consolidated by Justinian in the 6th century ad. It consists of four parts, 
the Institutes, Digest, Code, and Novels. It forms the basis for the modern Civil legal system in Europe.  
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      The challenge for the Conflict practitioner, policy maker or specialist is- how does he or 
she create institutions, policies and programs of governance that take full account of history, 
religion and culture that are acceptable not only to the people which must use them but also from 
the international community who have risked much to intervene? This is the existential question. 
These challenges can be met with a vertical understanding of this phenomenon for policy makers 
at the top down to the program specialist administering programs with their host nation counter-
part.  As Whit Mason points out that, “On conditions, the rule of law grows, needs nurturing, 
and has to be in sync with local ecologies. It can’t just be screwed in, though it can be screwed 
up, and it depends as much on what’s going on around it, on the particular things in that 
ecological niche, as on its own characteristics. This is a larger point than it seems, and even 
larger still when one comes to consequences.” (Mason, 2011 p15) The influence of each of these 
elements of society is shown along with the questions which are raised. These questions should 
provide the necessary point of reference for how to approach institutional design in each 
category.   
       Before going further, it is important to emphasize that nearly all institutions and programs 
that are part of a post conflict development program are focused on building and strengthening 
governance. Governance can be both a noun in this case and a verb and it is important that one 
recognizes these attributes of governance at the beginning.  
We should therefore operate from 5 Key Assumptions or Perspectives that are embedded  in my 
model:  
They Are:  
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1.) Governance is not synonymous with government.  
2.) Governance is less about “tangibles” and more about “intangibles.” Governance is about 
power and authority, codified through rules, Rule of Law and Norms (History, Religion 
& Culture). 
3.) We as post conflict peace-builders and practitioners should take an empirical rather than 
a normative approach to governance. We believe that governance legitimacy is 
determined by those in the system- not outsiders – and that data can and often contradicts 
value judgments. 
4.) “Theory of Change,” and the principles that underpin it, are a relevant approach for 
understanding and helping to develop governance strategies. 
5.) Governance must therefore be approached through a “systems lens”, recognizing that 
governance systems are complex, human and adaptive. 
      
     In order to more fully comprehend the premise of each of the above assumptions, I would like 
to unpack and describe them each in more detail. The first assumption is that formal 
governments are only one type of system of authority and not even the most common. Authority 
systems differ from state to state, culture to culture and can be corporate, religious, clan, or tribal 
and number possibly in the millions. Secondly, governance is mostly about “intangibles.” The 
formal descriptions of governance generally center on tangibles such as security, health care, 
educations etc. In other words, they are what are known as “public goods.” They are however 
only manifestations of power and authority- who has it, how it is wielded and what is demanded 
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of authority in return. These intangible power dynamics are what must be understood if we are to 
affect successful outcomes. The majority of systems of authority are not codified in law, but 
rather defined by norms. 
“The concept of the rule of law, whatever else can be said about it, has to do with the way power 
is exercised. There might be much more to the rule of law than this, but for millennia, and at 
least since Aristotle, people have noticed one salutary distinction in particular: that between 
circumstances in which power can be exercised arbitrarily and those where law – not on its own, 
but together with other social agencies, actors, institutions and norms – plays a real role in 
channeling the exercise of power, and in particular in constraining the possibility of its arbitrary 
exercise. (Mason, 2011 p24) 
      It is these norms which we must fully understand. These norms are artifacts of culture - 
“unwritten” rules if you will. They are powerful and command respect from those within the 
culture. Thirdly, we must take an empirical and non-normative approach to developing 
institutions and programs. This simply means that we must examine what “is” rather than what 
we believe, from our own cultural reference, what “should be.”  Using the Democratic Peace 
theory proposition from before, we might make the statement, “Countries should be 
democratic.” This is a subjective value judgment that too often becomes a national foreign policy 
stance.  Another commonly recognized normative stance is “Women should have equal rights.” 
What happens when this normative attitude is contradictory to the history, religion and culture of 
the subject state? What impediments to our normative agendas might we encounter? The point is 
that we must look at the data empirically backed by observable trends regarding power and 
authority. This, regardless of those norms we would like to be true and what we would like to 
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enforce. Fourth, Theory of Change is relevant for understanding and implementing governance. 
Theory of Change provides a comprehensive description about how change happens. 
Understanding the phases of change is to understand people and the complex relationships the 
lay at the heart of all human systems. There is an old Suffi saying, “You think because you 
understand one you must understand two, because one and one make two. But you must also 
understand and.”  Lastly, this brings us to assumption 5 which is viewing governance through a 
systems lens. As mentioned previously, governance is fundamentally human, complex and 
interdependent.  Taking a holistic approach to analysis is critical. This helps us to view issues not 
as isolated incidences but rather as an interrelated part that works within parts of a system.  If we 
operate from these 5 assumptions, we will be less likely to revert to cultural and normative 
biases, take on board what is likely best for those who are part of the system and therefore also 
less likely to develop what I call, “Fixes that Fail.” 19  
In the illustration below I have attempted to show how the key elements of history, religion 
and culture should flow down toward programs design.  
      
                                                     
19 Fixes that fail is a system archetype that in system dynamics is used to describe and analyze a situation, where a 
fix effective in the short-term creates side effects for the long-term behavior of the system and may result in the 
need of even more fixes. 
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Figure 2  Kleponis Post Conflict Institutional Design Model 
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     Figure 2 above illustrates the relationship in each of the 5 elements that underlay post 
conflict institutional development.  These include the police or internal defense, legal 
institutions, central and local governments, social institutions and finally the economy. All 
of these are tied to traditional power structures, religious dictates or historical paradigms. 
Each of these key elements of developing a society is informed by one, two or a 
combination of all. The model also points out the importance of seeking out which of these 
underlying influences is historically tied to these institutions and developing polices and 
structures that will conform and even leverage them. Much of the published works describes 
how the failure to do the research and take them into consideration resulted in as mentioned, 
passive resistance, inconsistent application of policy and in some case direct pushback from 
the local institutional players. In the worst of cases, the locals sought satisfaction from 
alternative providers such as Al Qaida and the Taliban.  
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CHAPTER 3:  ANALYSIS OF PUBLISHED WORKS 
     In this chapter I have incorporated the published works or papers and outlined their contents 
as they relate to post conflict management. Each of the selected papers deal with some aspect of 
Post Conflict Management as they influence one of the main subsets of the Post Conflict Model 
introduced earlier in Chapter 2. Presented for brevity for this Critical Appraisal are abstracts of 
each published work. The original papers are provided under separate cover.  
 
3.1 Paper 1:  
Bridging the Strategic Gap: Key Missions and New Directions to Address Security 
Policing in Transitioning Conflict Environments 
 
Strategic Studies Institute: Fall (2015) The Strategic Studies Institute publishes national 
security and strategic research and analysis to influence policy debate and bridge the gap 
between military and academia. 
 
     This work has been predicated on both the writings of serving military policemen as well as 
research conducted by independent consultants.  It examines contemporary challenges in 
defining the roles and missions required for effective post conflict policing, particularly for any 
role the Department of Defense, and possibly elements of the United States Army, may play to 
fill what have already been determined to be capability gaps in U.S. government response. 
     The Department of Defense has, during the last two conflicts spanning 13 years, been given 
the lead for Rule of Law Reform; specifically, with the building, resourcing, training and 
mentoring of host nation police organizations for several reasons, not the least of which has been 
the non-permissive operating area that would not allow for non-military to carry out training 
missions autonomously. Success in this area has been mixed. Several approaches have been 
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taken from using general purpose forces, coalition paramilitary organizations to civilian 
contractors to carry out these tasks. The sheer number of diversity of individuals, organizations, 
methodologies and program objectives has led to a disjointed and uneven effort which naturally 
has resulted in uneven success.  
   Concurrently, the Department of Defense should re-examine its capability and capacity in this 
realm in order to maximize its ability to assist the Department of State and the overall 
intergovernmental post-conflict policing and security establishment..  
     The focus of this work briefly discusses this strategic gap but also sets out to identify a 
method that the US Army may be able to use to successfully bridge this gap. As the availability 
of the Military Police Corps to field commanders has been reduced , it may present an 
opportunity to both redefine and possibly reduce the quantity of MP doctrinal tasks while 
increasing the Military Police Corps level of specialization, professionalism, and value to the 
Army. 
     Much the way companies in industry are constantly reviewing and improving shareholder 
value by focusing in the most “value added” business lines, and shedding those that present less 
value over time, likewise the MP Corps can similarly consider which of their current “business 
lines” they might want to shed and which, as a branch , they would want to  invest time and 
resources in to become the recognized subject matter experts in crime, internment operations, 
law and order and indigenous police capacity building.  As a result, the MP Corps would become 
the Commanders’ consultant in such areas. 
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     Lastly, the Department of Defense must do more to improve its policing, criminal intelligence 
gathering and analysis competencies. DOD must be specialists in these areas that have become 
especially important in the battle space. The Army, and specifically the MP Corps is being 
presented what amounts to a “revenue neutral” opportunity. It can address a strategic gap that 
exists while significantly improving its value to the Army.   
 
3.2 Paper 2:    
The Formation of Conflict Entrepreneurs: A Cultural and Political      Explanation of 
the Organized Criminal State in Afghanistan 
 
Small Wars Journal: Fall 2015 Small Wars Journal publishes original works from  authentic 
voices across the spectrum of stakeholders in small wars. It is the most widely read journal by 
actual operational practitioners of post conflict management coming from a wide array of 
academic, military, political and humanitarian organizations and agencies.  
Academica.edu: July 2016  Academia.edu is a platform for academics to share research papers. 
The company's mission is to accelerate the world's research. 
 
 
     As the US involvement in Afghanistan draws to a close, speculation from all  
 
circles envelops as to what kind of country will emerge after 13 years of aid, advice and  
 
infrastructure investment. It is often reported that the key impediments to progress in  
 
Afghanistan is its endemic corruption. The phenomenon of corruption in Afghanistan is  
 
one in which the coalition and some members of the Afghan government struggle with  
 
daily. It is nightmarishly complex and because it is so interwoven into the fabric of the  
 
State, organized criminal enterprises, the Taliban and other variant conflict entrepreneurs:  
 
the solutions elude us. The existential question on tackling corruption is: what threshold  
 
do we tolerate? Do we tolerate some corruption? Do we reluctantly tolerate a lot of  
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corruption? Or, do we tolerate corruption only from our perceived "friends" who  
 
cooperate with us? Is the toleration of corruption really just bribery to gain the co-  
 
operation of the government we largely created but are unable now to control? Is that not  
 
in itself corruption and what is our role? Where is the line between "Afghan Good  
 
Enough" and "Zero Tolerance?" What doctrine and policy is to be adopted that while  
 
morally and ethically defendable, may if we are not careful, derail other unseen agendas at  
 
work and if pursued might be a case of the cure killing the patient?  
 
     This article assesses each option and transcends the debate with a possible  
 
pathway forward.  
 
3.3: Paper 3    
China’s Role in the Stabilization of Afghanistan 
 
Strategic Studies Institute: July 8th 2009 
Global Security.org: GlobalSecurity.org is the leading source of background information 
and developing news stories in the fields of defense, space, intelligence, WMD, and 
homeland security. Launched in 2000, GlobalSecurity.org is the most comprehensive 
and authoritative online destination for those in need of both reliable background 
information and breaking news. GlobalSecurity.org, is well-respected, trusted and 
often-referenced in the media, both domestically and internationally. 
China Aid Data http://china.aiddata.org/resources/25161 China.aiddata.org is a 
collaborative online platform that seeks to make information about Chinese development 
finance flows to Africa more accessible and usable. By sharing, synthesizing, and 
standardizing diverse sources of development finance information from journalists, 
scholars, government officials, business professionals, and local community stakeholders, 
this open data platform is designed to facilitate better analysis and understanding of 
Chinese development finance activities in Africa. 
JSTOR.org: https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep11278?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents 
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Over the years, China’s ambivalent relationship toward Afghanistan   recently began to change 
as the prospects of an Afghan stabilized security situation begin to emerge, and the Chinese view 
is that the momentum is on the side of the Coalition. For an indication of their prognosis of 
Afghanistan’s future, one need only follow where the money is being bet, and the Chinese are 
betting on success.  
     This growing interest and confidence in our abilities to bring the country under government 
control, destroy, marginalize or reconcile ”spoilers” and bring about structural change in 
Afghanistan is particularly manifested in China’s recent $3.5 billion investment in the Aynak 
Copper field in Logar province. This is the single largest foreign direct investment in Afghan 
history and portends to be just the beginning of a systematic and deliberate program to engage 
the Afghans economically and exploit the vast natural resource wealth of the country. China 
Metallurgical Group, the company that won the bid is now, for example, also engaged in bidding 
for the rights to develop iron-ore deposits at Hajigak in the central province of Bamiyan, west of 
Kabul. With this deal to extract the enormously rich copper reserves in Aynak, and build the 
huge infrastructure necessary to do so (apparently even promising to build mosques), Beijing 
has, in a “single move,” strengthened its hold on a vital resource, engineered the single largest 
investment in Afghan history, promised to create thousands of new Afghan jobs, and established 
itself as the Afghan government’s preeminent business partner and single largest source of tax 
payments. And, of course, the commercial and geopolitical benefits of this win-win win-win all 
accrue to China thanks to the (relative) security offered by the U.S. military.  All in all, the 
project is billed as an example of how China’s leaders, flush with money and in control of both 
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the government and major industries, meld strategy, business, and statecraft into a seamless 
whole.   
     Critics naturally assert that China is “free-riding” on the extensive stabilization efforts of the 
United States and the Coalition. While there may be truth in this statement, is not the 
establishment of long -term, sustainable economic projects that produce  jobs for Afghans, 
revenues for the central government and enduring municipal infra-structures consistent with our 
overall goal of Afghan stability?  
 
    The contribution of this published article is that policy makers in the United States have taken 
a new look at the development model that China employs in Africa and are re-considering large 
self-sustaining projects in Afghanistan instead of projects that are expensive and require 
continual aid money in order to run such as hospitals and schools. The author was invited to the 
Chinese Embassy in Kabul shortly after the publication of this piece along with the Deputy 
Interior Minister to discuss how the Ministry could assist the Chinese further on the project. The 
article has been translated into Chinese and has been distributed in a number of  multiple English 
and Chinese publications.  
 
3.4  Paper 4:                                    
 CSI Kabul:An Example of Failing to Understand Local Legal Structures and  
Traditions Before Attempting to Re-Establish The Rule of Law and Police 
 
Academia.edu: June 2015 
European Journal of International Security: (Pending Review) July 2016 
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Social Science Research Network: (May 2015)  
Crime dramas proliferate throughout our television lives across all of the networks and cable. In 
particular there has been the exploding popularity of Crime Scene Investigation (CSI) programs 
where the crimes are solved by technical and scientific methodologies by forensic detectives. 
Often these TV series highlight multiple cities in the US, such as CSI New York, CSI Miami and 
CSI Las Vegas, but to list a few. They also have international appeal and have therefore been 
replicated in other countries. This phenomenon has also resulted in a near nine-fold increase in 
forensic science and criminology degree programs. It seems like everyone wants to be part of the 
CSI craze and the US Army Military Advisors are no exception. Even Reuters reported that in 
Afghanistan, “Afghan Confidential: detectives train at CSI Kabul ”, was no exception. This story 
highlighted the attempts of the US Police Advisory Arm of ISAF to create just such a capability 
within the Afghan National Police Force. To that end, in October 2014, a contract to carry on 
with the LEPs20 Program 2 which included specifically former law enforcement professionals 
trained in crime scene analysis was awarded. This contract was awarded by the Coalition 
Security Transition Command- Afghanistan (CSTC-A)3 . This was also aimed as a source of 
training for the Afghan police in forensics and investigations. This proposal was mooted as long 
back as 2010, from the CJ-74 shop. Such a proposal strikes me as odd that they would be 
proposing to train the police in these skills, particularly when the legal structure in Afghanistan 
was different from the US and that the role of the Police was not only different, but severely 
                                                     
20  The Law Enforcement Professional Program was a program conceived and implemented by the US Department 
of Defence to recruit former civilian police professionals to assist uniformed US military in the mission of training 
and mentoring indigenous police forces in post conflict environments such as Iraq and Afghanistan. The results of 
the program were mixed with any deciding that civilian police practices as found in the United States did not travel 
well. In addition it was noted that many did not possess the cross cultural experience to function effectively in such 
an environment.  
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limited with respect to policing powers found in the US or the UK. In fact, not only was the 
program they were advocating beyond really not only the competency of the Afghan Police, but 
beyond their remit as a Police Force. Accordingly, this article seeks to highlight the problematic 
nature of the program they were proposing, as well as assess its feasibility and draw a broader 
basis for such reform. Furthermore, this article seeks to challenge the tendency of many post 
conflict planners and practitioners to not fully understand the context of the cultural, societal, 
political and in this particular case, the legal structures of the nations in which they are operating 
but simply revert back to systems and processes which they know and are comfortable with. The 
reasons for this are many but the primary reasons will be illustrated within this paper 
3.5  Paper 5:    
The 21st Century Answer to “Burning Their Crops and Salting Their Fields” 
Interdicting and Destroying the ISIS Financial Network 
 
Small Wars Journal: February 2016: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-21st-century-
answer-to-%E2%80%9Cburning-their-crops-and-salting-their-fields%E2%80%9D-
interdicting-and- 
Indian Strategic Studies: http://strategicstudyindia.blogspot.com/search?updated-
max=2015-08-07T00:25:00%2B05:30&max-results=34&reverse-paginate=true 
 
Academica.edu: November 2016 
Arizona State University, Center for Strategic Communication 2016 
https://csc.asu.edu/2015/08/01/the-21st-century-answer-to-burning-their-crops-
and-salting-their-fields-interdicting-and-destroying-the-isis-financial-network/ 
 
The enemy of terrorism has evolved particularly over the past decade in terms of organization, 
resourcing, public relations and above all tactics. I have written on several occasions that today’s 
terrorist organizations more resemble organized criminal organizations rather than the strictly 
political or military organizations they once were. We have seen ISIS or the so called 
“Caliphate” organized in such a way that they keep organized records, have accountants, bankers 
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and budget directors – all to keep track of the money which is the life blood of their organization. 
Their income, not unlike any other organized criminal element comes from the sale of 
commodities (in this case oil), protection rackets, human trafficking and out-right robbery. The 
point is that we are essentially fighting organized criminal gangs using tactics, techniques and 
procedures one would use on military insurgents and this is just the wrong approach. Instead of 
tasking just the military to deal with the problem as they will simply address it in the only way 
they know how, we should start thinking like crime fighters and like the FBI and other federal 
law enforcement in the US and in Europe, hit the terrorist and insurgents (criminal gangs) where 
they live and that is at the bank. 
     The effect of this piece was that it was picked up in the Pentagon J-5 Strategic Plans & 
Policies division along with other similar pieces to change the way the war-fighters were looking 
at the ISIS phenomenon. The shift toward fighting their sources of revenue as well as interdicting 
the monies as they were transferred internally and abroad became one of the core areas of 
emphasis in combatting IS. Donald J. Trump the presumptive Republican nominee in the US, 
used the exact phrase “burn their crops and salt their fields” in a stump speech in late 2015 when 
referring to combatting ISIS. One of his campaign staff indicated to the author it was from this 
piece which was read by one of his campaign staff.  
3.6 Paper 6:                            
  Old Rules- New Threats: Keeping the Peace in the 21st Century 
 
Academia.edu: April 15, 2015 
The world essentially experienced the coming of the 21st century with one of the most dramatic 
terrorists attacks ever perpetrated. The events of 911 contained all of the ingredients of the new 
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paradigm in global threats. First, the attack was conducted by an ideologically motivated 
transnational group based in and emanating from a “failed state”. Second, the attack was 
conducted on a financially and militarily powerful liberal democracy. Third, the attackers 
transformed common technology into weapons of mass destruction, killing thousands for world-
wide media consumption. Fourth, they did this using the individual freedoms and permissiveness 
of the targeted open society to wage asymmetrical warfare against it. This is the new face of the 
threat that confronts us in the 21st century. This case however has opened up a new legal 
dialogue on the international use of force and the ability of countries to defend themselves 
ostensibly by invading other countries. The 911 case pushed the envelope of legal and strategic 
doctrine because at the time there were only two bodies of law codified in treaty that aggrieved 
nations could draw on. They were the NATO Treaty and of course UN Conventions for the use 
of force. In order to gain a fuller understanding of where we are as an international community 
we must also understand what series of legal and political events occurred immediately after 911. 
As with any forensic investigation we must first look at the facts surrounding the occurrence and 
subsequent legal, military and political actions.  
     The purpose of this paper is to explore how the rise of terrorism and non-state actors attacking 
population centers and nations have challenged the legacy legal construct of aggressively 
reacting to threats as well as the notion of national self-defense. In this paper we will explore 
using examples of legal precedent as well as new interpretation of long standing law to justify 
the actions taken by the United States and other Coalition members in response to the 911 
terrorist attacks. 
51 
 
3.7 Paper 7:                  
Throwing the Book at the Taliban: Undermining Taliban Legitimacy by Highlighting 
Their Own Hypocrisy 
  
Originally submitted personally to General Petraeus to use as a talking paper for a 
symposium on Information Operations for International Security Assistance Force-
Afghanistan (ISAF) September 2010 
Small Wars Journal: July 19, 2010 http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/throwing-the-book-
at-the-taliban 
Strategic Studies Institute: October 14, 2010 
https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/newsletter/Aug2010.htm 
 
 
By the title, this paper examines and discusses the relationship of the Taliban with the local 
people and how in many instances it deviates from their own code of conduct as codified in the 
guidance provided by their key leaders. NATO, who have been highly criticized by both the 
international community as well as the Afghan government for civilian casualties is also keen to 
point out the outright atrocities conducted by the Taliban on the civilian population in direct 
contravention of their own code of conduct. The idea is in pointing out their own hypocrisy, the 
Taliban are revealed not to be the religious or moral guardians of the people but just another 
murderous, brutal criminal gang in search of power. Additionally, there are divisions of thinking 
within the Taliban; one which is interested in gaining political power, cleaving to the traditional 
tenets of Islam and ridding the country of foreign influences. The other interested in organized 
crime, drug trafficking, intimidation and terror.  By revealing and shaming the Taliban writ large, 
these divisions can be exploited and exacerbated thus creating turmoil within the organizations.    
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     The "Jihadi Layeha" or "Regulations for Jihad” is a document, first obtained by Coalition 
Forces in 2006, contains 15 pages and 29 strictures. In 2009, the now 61 page document was 
updated and supplemented by additional rules for the conduct of Mujahedeen. It is now divided 
into 13 chapters outlining 67 sections for individual deportment and organizational conduct.  
The rulebook's 13 chapters delve into peace, treatment of prisoners, espionage, logistics, booty, 
strategies, Taliban internal affairs, education, organization, social issues, prohibitions, worship, 
and recommendations to field commanders for items not specifically covered in the document 
itself.   
     The rulebook is a rich area for analysis. It provides observers with insight into Taliban weak  
points, vulnerabilities and fears currently entrenched within the Taliban organization and its top  
leadership. It also provides Coalition Forces a handy reference document to catalog Taliban 
transgressions against the very people they are trying to win over. This document reveals the  
Taliban's attempt to wage a guerrilla campaign implementing a rudimentary population-centric  
Strategy; while calling upon elements of the Pashtunwali and Sharia (Islamic) Law into their 
doctrine.  This document, if properly analyzed and understood by Coalition and Afghan  
authorities, presents a compelling opportunity to exploit an organizational control weakness  
within the Taliban structure and create a focused and comprehensive IO campaign against them 
by pointing out to the Afghan people Taliban hypocrisy in each and every instance of barbarity 
that expressly contradicts their own doctrine. 
  
     The net effect of this piece was that General Petraeus was able to elucidate his position on this 
particular tactic against the Taliban using what is known as “Information Operations.”  The CJ-2 
along with the Information Ops branch of the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) 
53 
 
constructed a program to bring to light the un-Islamic practices of the Taliban and other 
violations of their own Taliban behavior guides.  
3.8 Paper 8:                           
 Sovereignty & Security:US Authority & Legal Obligations Regarding Detainees in 
Iraq 
 
Social Science Research Network: June 24, 2015 
Academica.edu: June 2015 
 
Distributed in National Security & Foreign Relations Law eJournal 
Vol 13, Issue 51, May 30, 2016 
 
Distributed in Public International Law: Foreign Relations & Policy Law eJournal 
Vol 3, Issue 33, June 01, 2016 
 
Distributed in International Institutions: Laws, Rule-Making/Interpretation, & Compliance 
eJournal Vol 3, Issue 17, March 15, 2016 
 
Throughout history the taking of prisoners has always been an artifact of warfare. Prisoners 
taken during ancient times could have been released back to their own sides after the payment of 
ransom. Some prisoners as was the Roman practice, taken back to Rome and pressed into a 
lifetime of slavery. In nearly all cultures throughout the history of warfare, prisoners where held 
and killed.  The fact of prisoners as a natural and expected consequence of conflict was often 
planned for and the conditions of their imprisonment, and treatment was in the beginning of the 
16th century and ending in the 20th century codified into Treaty and International Statute.  
Because of the shifting nature of warfare particularly in the beginning of the 21st century, 
prisoners no longer neatly fit into the categories set forth in existing law.  The question of what 
to do with armed resistance and how to categorize them created confusion and indeed violations 
of international law.  After the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the United States and its 
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Coalition Allies soon found themselves in the midst of a full blown insurgency. Nearly four 
years later it found itself on the brink of civil war. The US and Coalition, as they struggled with 
training Iraqi Security Forces, and building a constitutionally compliant government and legal 
framework, had to  deal with those that not only stood  in the way of those efforts but actively 
took up arms against both the Coalition and newly formed Iraqi government. There was an array 
of these groups at work in Iraq at the time, motivated by ideology, religion, deeply harbored 
ethnic resentments, and political aspirations. Whatever their motivations, the outcomes were the 
same – violence, destabilization and death. The Coalition Forces, in cooperation with the newly 
trained Iraqi Forces are at once worked hard to  counter these elements and in doing so captured 
and detained Iraqi citizens through security operations that took place throughout the country. 
These operations and the subsequent detainment of those individuals opened up some interesting 
questions in not only the Law of Armed Conflict but also its legality under international law writ 
large. This paper seeks to briefly explore those questions. The positions put forth are based on 
the interpretation of current law as well as the personal experiences of the author himself as a 
military commander charged with the undertaking of housing and detaining such individuals.  
3.9 Paper 9:       
AT LEAST DO NO HARM: The Negative Effects and Unforeseen Consequences of US 
Contracting Practices on the Afghan   Local Community and its Influence on the 
Perception of US Forces and Americans 
 
Small Wars Journal, May 2018: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/least-do-no-harm-
negative-effects-and-unforeseen-consequences-us-contracting-practices 
Social Sciences Resource Network: 21 May 2018 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3182415 
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While there is a Coalition effort in the conflict in Afghanistan, the overwhelming bulk of the 
resources, personnel and money come from the US.  The main vector of those monies that 
flow into the Afghan economy, both directly and indirectly, come through the US 
Department of Defense Contracting entity. While the ambitions of the projects funded by the 
contracting process are noble and the intentions are to elevate the economic and social 
conditions of the Afghan people are genuine, in many cases the reality is that it is having the 
opposite effect.  
     The US contracting office and officers for that matter are far removed from the 
commercial dynamics and interactions of US Prime Contractor companies and those of the 
sub-contractors who are mainly local nationals. Some of the commercial practices that are 
undertaken by the prime contractors are harmful to the Afghan sub-contractors and because 
of the remoteness of the contracting offices and the inaccessibility of contracting personnel, 
local nationals who have legitimate grievances have little recourse to present their 
complaints. The invoicing and payment methodologies used by and considered normal by 
the West and in this case, the practice of the US Government, rely on credit which requires 
the purveyor of the goods or services to have the capital to carry it from invoice payment to 
invoice payment. To make things even more challenging, these payments are delayed even 
in the best of circumstances and often by months. This has a disastrous effect on local 
national companies struggling to meet payroll and to fund operations. This condition is often 
made worse by what I will describe as “bad actors” in the US commercial contracting 
community whose practices injure small to medium sized local national companies.  
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     The reason that this phenomenon must be addressed is that the actual effects in the local 
national community are often exactly the opposite of what the US is intending through the 
commissioning of projects. Rather than winning hearts and minds through employment, 
establishing hospitals and schools, it is driving a wedge between the US and the locals by 
showing them that the real face of the US is greed and deception. The lack of oversight by 
the US Contracting agencies, the manipulative practices by prime contractors and the 
cascading economic impact it has on the local community serves to undo all of the good 
work otherwise done by the US military, NGOs and diplomats.   
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CHAPTER 4:  EMERGING THEMES, CONCEPTS AND STRATEGIES  
     There are several underlying themes that are interwoven throughout the broad spectrum of the 
post conflict management discipline. The research effort, from which these writings come, is the 
result of a 10 year longitudinal study in which I have become increasingly confident of my 
observations and conclusions. This primary research and observation has taken me through the 
battlefields of Iraq while training and deploying Iraq Special Police Forces to all thirty four 
provinces of Afghanistan where I both participated in the effort to produce Rule of Law and 
security programs and subsequently observed their progress.  In my writings over the past decade 
in this new and evolving field of study and practice, I have identified a few prominent and 
enduring themes. I have also sought to connect them to the issues or challenges that are not being 
faced or were faced at the time and suggested, based on study and personal experience, possible 
solutions to overcome those challenges. In doing so I hope to  perhaps shed light on topics and 
concerns to help create better programs and structures for future practitioners so that they are 
able to benefit from the experience of others in similar circumstances. In each of the works 
presented for consideration and commentary, a particular issue has been highlighted, and using 
resources such as personal experience, current literature, focused studies, interviews and 
published lessons-learned,  I have guided the reader through the issues, the perceived causes of 
the issues, collateral challenges, the cultural and social contexts in which they are occurring and 
recommendations for the practitioner.  If  I could point to one overarching theme however it 
would be the subject of rule of law reform which I will also refer to as governance. As was 
mentioned earlier, rule of law or governance touches nearly all elements in peace and stability 
operations and reconstruction efforts. Governance is that one artifact of society and indeed most 
cultures that is the enabling element from which all other nodes of society derive power, 
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legitimacy and efficacy.  All of the works examine the functioning of the Rule of Law and in 
some identify the root causes of conflict which is the absence of the governance. 
      Most policy makers and practitioners define SSR in the context of post conflict as both an 
intervention program as well as a process. SSR is essentially a program intervention, supported 
and implemented by internal as well as external actors whose aim is to alter the existing security 
institutions in a given state.  This involves the fundamental reorganization and reconstitution of 
existing institutional structures or norms.  “The ideal achievement is a  security sector 
characterized by a practically boundless list of liberal and Weberian21 qualities- civilian 
oversight and accountability; effective governance and service delivery; professionalism; 
legitimacy and ownership; and sustainability, to name a few” (Armstrong, 43). This is clearly a 
Western normative approach to governance as described by Weber as it focuses on the tangibles 
of governance as mentioned in the previous chapter.  Since it is focused on tangibles, it therefore 
also focuses on technical solutions to adaptive challenges. While technical change can be 
implemented with current technical know-how such as functional expertise and existing ways of 
doing things, adaptive change cannot.  Since SSR usually involves frequent and significant 
interaction between foreign forces and host nation actors, it is usually assumed that this precise 
mix of interaction will ignite a process of institutional change and bring about the intended 
results. It is however a much more complicated and difficult experience. (Peake, Scheye, and 
Hills 2008, Sheye 2010).    After a decade into the interventions of Iraq and Afghanistan, 
practitioners are still confounded by the lofty goals of Security Sector Reform and the dizzying 
                                                     
21   In this context I use Max Weber’s theory which defined the state as an entity that successfully claims a 
"monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory". He was also the first to categorize social 
authority into distinct forms, which he labeled as charismatic, traditional, and rational-legal. His analysis of 
bureaucracy emphasized that modern state institutions are increasingly based on rational-legal authority. 
59 
 
array of complex issues and obstacles that face them.  (Channa 2002, Podder 2013, Schnabel and 
Born, 2011). This is due in part because SSR provides really no more than a normative blueprint- 
for analysts, an unrealistic benchmark to assess widespread program failures, for professionals, a 
collection of lessons-learned and “Best Practices” (Armstrong 2014) . Because of these 
challenges, there has been significant debate on a re-focus on post conflict planning.  This has 
involved the recognition of a greater emphasis on pragmatism or as previously mentioned 
empirical analysis and less on ideology and process or a normative approach. Naturally the 
emphasis must be more on cultural and social contextualization.  This simply means that, 
through experience, there is now recognition that in certain contexts, particularly conflict –prone 
states, conditions might not be appropriate for wholesale top-down reform relying on a 
normative values approach. The focus of these works and the author’s professional research at 
present is how to resolve and overcome this “conceptual-contextual divide” (Chana, 2002). 
      Post-Conflict Management and Security Sector Reform lack theory as such in terms of 
case explanation, but they still are theoretical from the perspective that they are a collection of 
ideas that guide collective action. (Armstrong 2014) The main failing in post conflict 
management as a sort of social science  is that it lacks specific program theory. It lacks an 
articulated explanation or a least a set of assumptions for how specific inputs, activities and 
interactions will trigger desired outcomes (Patricia J. Rogers et al. 2000, Patricia J. Rogers and 
Weiss, 2007, Rossi, Lipsey and Freeman 2004, 146-164, Weiss 1997). What is  more is that the 
practitioners who mainly comprise the military in many cases focus on input metrics rather than 
60 
 
outputs or outcome metrics which provides a much skewed impression of success.22 At least two 
of the papers presented take time to describe this input metric/outcome metric dynamic among 
the US military and how it affects the projects and policies they create. 
      Most policy and program interventions begin with a logic model.  This means that they 
hold a position or at least assume that a certain group of inputs will produce a desired result. 
Often they are visually accompanied by a flow chart or table which outlines and pictorially 
shows the logical sequence of the inputs activities and short-term and long-terms outcomes. For 
example the OECD Handbook 23  spells out this simplistic and assumptive process of phases 
which include assessment, consensus-building, and program design and implementation phase 
which technical assistance and capacity development; and a consolidation phase that provides 
long-term finance and technical support (OECD 2007, 24-36, Sedra 2010c,9) ) In other words, 
many engaged in rule of law reform unconsciously approach the field from what I would equate 
to  a Newtonian physics standpoint –“ For every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction.” 
Or what I might paraphrase by saying - influence occurs as a direct result of force exerted from 
one person to another and that we can predict with accuracy the effect of such actions.24 In 
                                                     
22 The military has a cultural preference for input metrics. It is the author’s opinion that this arises from two 
conditions. The first is a short-term period of performance measurement as the personnel responsible for program 
implementation are just not there very long and can attribute results by “what has been done” as they are not 
around long enough to see “what has been achieved.” Secondly, because of the dynamic and sometimes even 
chaotic environment of post conflict reform, they have little actual power over indigenous actors thus cling to 
input metrics as those variables they are able to control instead of those variables and outcomes they are unable 
to influence.  
23 Handbook issued by OECD that goes through the program assistance cycle which is the assessment, design and 
implementation processes. It also provides guidance on monitoring and reviewing progress.  
24 This phrase is loosely derived from Sir Isaac Newton’s Third Law which formally is: For every action, there is an 
equal and opposite reaction. I often use this Third Law to also describe the interactions between people and 
among societies.  
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actuality, quantum physics is probably more applicable. Quantum physics warns that predicting 
and controlling the impact of reform initiatives is futile. It addresses probabilities rather than 
certainties and recognizes that change happens in jumps, beyond any power of precise 
prediction.25 Moreover change cannot be forced. Quantum physics is all about emergent change.   
Much like our assumptions of governance in the preceding chapter, we can apply a few 
assumptions to Rule of Law change. The first is that resistance is inevitable. Even those in the 
system who want change exhibit an “immunity to change.” The second is that change is difficult. 
While the percentage is disputed it is often said that 75% of all change projects fail. Whether one 
wants to believe this statistic or not even if one halves that figure it still spells difficulty. The 
third is that Rule of Law Reform is complex. The cause and effect components of both 
governance and security sector reform are inter-dependent and far apart in space and time- they 
cannot therefore be addressed piece meal. The World Bank proposes that no country has 
transformed its institutions in less than a generation (15-30 years.)26   
     The area of post-conflict studies and the specific feature of security sector reform require 
a new look in order to develop process based theory.  Presently, it lacks clear specification on 
how activities and inputs create or contribute to the achievement of its goals.  In these works the 
author points out the flaws in existing process or phased implantation as well as the seams and 
faults that helped to contribute to them. The author hopes to use these case examples in order to 
provide real life lessons to future state and international policy makers, planners and post conflict 
                                                     
25  Like the reference to Newton’s Third Law, I contrast this interaction of cultures by using the Quantum Theory or 
principle of physical interactions accordingly.  
26 This assessment is derived from multiple World Bank reports on change programs across spanning the socio-
economic and political spectrum. The numbers are the averages and represent those general estimates from the 
organization 
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practitioners to help them with considering various elements for better program design and 
implementation.  
 
Coercive and Non-Coercive Power in Military Conflict Management Professionals 
 
Today’s warrior-diplomats27 must recognize and form an appreciation for the role of non-
coercive or so called “soft power” projection28. Understanding that there are merits as well as 
limits to non-coercive power will enable policy makers, but particularly military leaders, to gain 
both an understanding of the application of non-coercive power strategies as well as an 
appreciation of its possible effects.  This will not dilute their abilities as combat leaders but 
rather provide them with a greater arsenal of implements to apply across the range of military 
and civil military operations. Military leaders, for a number of reasons have been tasked to take 
the lead in SSR, Rule of Law reform as well as a host of civil support operations that has been 
until recently well beyond the remit of the traditional military mission. This has happened in 
recent conflicts for a number of reasons but chief among them is first, the military has a very 
streamlined budget process whereby monies can be easily applied to in periods of war or crisis 
and secondly, because of the military’s capacity to operate throughout the conflict zone. Other 
                                                     
27 I use this as short hand borrowed from Michael Waltz, for military personnel directly involved with SSR and Rule 
of Law programs in post-conflict transitional societies.  His meaning derives from the notion that these military 
persons trained in the use of violence must now recognize and be trained in the arts of diplomacy.  
28 Soft power is a concept developed by Joseph Nye of Harvard University to describe the ability to attract and co-
opt rather than by coercion (hard power), using force or giving money as a means of persuasion. Soft power is the 
ability to shape the preferences of others through appeal and attraction. A defining feature of soft power is that it 
is non-coercive; the currency of soft power is culture, political values, and foreign policies. Nye uses this in a global, 
macro-level context. I use it rather for the warrior diplomat to describe programs and tools to take a more 
constructivist approach to post conflict management (Rule of Law reform, educational reform, literacy, SSR etc.) 
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agencies and organizations do not have these advantages and in an almost unfortunate way the 
military has been left to the task. A task, that I would quickly add, in which they are neither 
trained nor equipped, nor for which, in most cases their leaders have appetite.  
Diagnosing the Right Root Cause Before Applying the Prescription- Understanding the 
Upstream & Downstream Causal Loops  
 
How then does one determine what, when and where to apply coercive vice non-coercive power 
and whom should apply it? The ‘what’ in this case, can partly be answered by defining the root 
causes of conflict and what environments enable them. In order however to identify the root 
causes one needs to have a thorough understanding of the population that one is working with. I 
have made the case in previous works that in the past that we did not have a fully developed 
appreciation of the internal conflict agendas in countries in which we intervened nor a full 
appreciation for the historical, ethnic and religious undercurrents running through these societies. 
Policy makers, before developing and applying policy, programs and funding, need to possess a 
deep seated understanding of what the root causes of intrastate conflict or failed states are.  They 
must understand the “Weak, failed and failing states” generally lack basic Weberian type 
institutional capacities. Thus the notion of developing institutions and  then the assumption that 
they will be transferred without developing the cultural imperatives to do so, is a set up for 
frustrating challenges at the least and at the worst- outright failure. Once again, having a full 
understanding and abiding appreciation for the historical, religious and cultural paradigms that 
are the foundation of the state in question is central toward success. The question now  is to how 
to prepare warrior-diplomats for these challenges that sorely press their current organizational 
and personal professional abilities.  How do we ensure that we have the right professionals with 
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the right academic and experiential skill sets to tackle these post conflict problems? Firstly, 
courses dealing with the subject of Conflict Management must look at this as a “whole of 
government approach.”  This must include study of the use of sanctions, coercive diplomacy, 
humanitarian intervention, peace operations, and robust applications of power to support 
negotiated conflict termination and other goals.  We must examine the use of military and 
economic tools in conjunction with one another.  These are often referred to as “hard power”29 
tools. While essential, they can be blunt instruments that are often hard to translate into desired 
political outcomes. Recent examples of that can currently be found in Eastern Afghanistan. It is 
difficult to muster and sustain the political will to deploy coercive instruments to prevent or 
terminate, even in cases of the worst abuse, the right kinds of coercive power to support conflict 
management goals. (Crocker, et al. p8 2007) 
      There is real value in exploring the merits of potential “non-kinetic”30 strategies for 
combating terrorism, multi-disciplinary tools for post-conflict peace operation, the role of legal 
tools, mediation initiatives and approaches for addressing local or regional conflicts.  As an 
example of creative programming, we have witnessed the new recognition of this importance by 
the formation and resourcing of Provincial Reconstruction Teams31 in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
                                                     
29 Hard power, so called includes those instruments of statecraft which refer to the more coercive methods of 
influencing other actors. They can include economic sanction, threat of military force or military force as a few 
examples.  
30 As opposed to “kinetic” warfare which involves the physical hitting, engaging or destroying, person, forces or 
infrastructure, “non-kinetic” warfare are those methods use to gain advantage or outcomes that do not involve 
physically engaging persons or things in an aggressively physical way. Intelligence gathering and psychological 
operations fall into this realm but the term has developed a broader meaning when referring to achieving 
outcomes through alternative methods by engaging the population through non-traditional military means.  
31 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) A Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) is a unit introduced by the 
United States government, consisting of military officers, diplomats, and reconstruction subject matter experts, 
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These organizations that deliver “goods” to the civilian populace is an attempt to apply non-
coercive or persuasive power at the retail level in these areas. 
      Above all, the central message is that power comes in many shapes and forms and that 
conflict management requires a variety or indeed a mix or blend of intervention strategies 
bespoke to the type of situation found. This also reminds us that strategies of engagement based 
on these varied forms of power may provide an effective means of taming and eventually 
transforming conflicts if and only if great care is exercised in the formation of programs.  
       Understanding the causes of conflict is critical to developing effective conflict 
management strategies. Likewise, understanding the capabilities of various approaches to 
conflict management and the consequences of using one verses another approach must also be 
understood by leaders.  Being sensitive to these elements, however, is only part of designing a 
successful conflict management strategy. Another crucial element is appreciating the role of 
framing, that is, the way you and others see the problem. This is where the importance of cross 
culture competency plays a vital role. Which lenses the policy specialists will use determines 
how he interprets the conflict and grasps the tools in the tool kit of conflict management. The 
importance of framing is especially important in today’s environment because of the divergence 
of international opinions and the decline of traditional spheres of consensus in a fairly new and 
dynamic field of study.  The differences of framing come from national interests, distinct cultural 
preferences and unique histories.   
                                                                                                                                         
working to support reconstruction efforts in unstable states. While the concepts are similar, PRTs may have 
separate compositions and missions. Their common purpose, however, is to empower local governments to 
govern their constituents more effectively. 
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     The international community and in particular the United States (Military) need to re-
examine the  approach to developing institutions and transferring policies challenges by taking a 
more nuanced approach. The old method of “If it don’t fit get a bigger hammer” often employed 
by military led interventions and reconstructions simply is not going to be effective as we have 
regrettably witnessed in Iraq from 2003-2005 when victory over the regime and the good will of 
the Iraqi people toward the intervention forces was squandered by the heavy handed tactics of 
coalition armies.  
“We Can’t Kill Our Way Out of This Conflict!”  
It is clear that the so called War on Terror cannot be won simply by targeting terrorists. The 
international community must apply the instruments of conflict management and prevention,  to 
the breeding grounds of terrorism- the conflict zones of so called failed states and those regions 
where intractable conflicts endure.  The current world situation increasingly points to a new kind 
of a strategic political resource in international relations, namely, a heightened role for “smart 
power”32 which effectively engages the multiple assets and instruments of official and 
nonofficial diplomacy and military power. Smart power involves the strategic use of diplomacy, 
persuasion, capacity building, and the projection of power and influence in ways that are cost-
effective and have political and social legitimacy. Smart power in a conflict management setting 
is attentive to the timing of mediated/negotiated interventions and the resources, capabilities, and 
                                                     
32 "Smart power" is a term developed in 2003 by the political scientist Joseph Nye Jr.  To counter the misperception 
that soft power or hard power alone can produce effective foreign policy. Power is one's ability to affect the 
behavior of others to get what one wants. There are three basic ways to do this: coercion, payment, and 
attraction. Hard power is the use of coercion and payment. Soft power is the ability to obtain preferred outcomes 
through attraction. If a state can set the agenda for others or shape their preferences, it can save a lot on what he 
terms carrots and sticks. But rarely can it totally replace either. Thus, the need for smart strategies that combine 
the tools of both hard and soft power. 
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strengths that different actors including non-state actors-bring to the multiple tasks of conflict 
management.  Smart power also looks to the lessons of the past decade and a half of conflict 
management and intervention successes as well as failures.  (Leashing the Dogs of War-Crocker, 
et al, 13)  The military has, in the past two decades has been increasing relied upon as a tool for 
not only fighting terror but also to rebuild shattered societies with its civil-military capacities. 
Building societies in a post conflict setting  must go hand in hand with the traditional business of 
diplomacy and conflict management and our military leaders necessarily will be part of this 
process. They therefore need to be armed with the academic understanding of these processes so 
that they can stand shoulder to shoulder with their civilian peers with the credibility that makes 
them effective.  Focusing in on and interpreting the causes correctly is essential to helping to 
define the prescription for conflict cessation. Analyzing the roles ethnicity, religion and most 
importantly economics play in intra-state conflict provide the necessary context to enable policy 
makers to design and construct useful and sustainable programs. Simply killing “terrorists” while 
easy to quantify (see again “input metrics”) and while making sensational headlines, does little to 
alleviate the root causes. Indeed it may just inflame local passions and make the actual problem 
that much worse. Policy makers and military leaders especially will need to become more 
creative in applying multi-faceted strategies. 
Economics and Causes of Intra-State Conflict  
 
Post-Conflict is nearly in all cases involved in some element of managing intra-state conflict 
which at its worst, manifests in civil war.  These civil wars lay in ethnic, religious, linguistic, or 
other inter-communal groups.  This fear and hatred of the opposing groups can feed hostilities 
between regimes and other internal groups. Greed also can feed violence especially when official 
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greed is enhanced by discoveries of new, contested sources of resource wealth such as oil, 
diamonds, gold and timber. Paul Collier a noted Oxford University Economist attributes poor 
economies and resource predation as the most common reasons for intrastate conflict. In his 
book “The Conflict Trap” he outlines what he considers the backdrop for most state conflicts.  
He examined global empirical patterns over the period of 1965- 1999. During this period, he 
posits the risk of civil war has been systematically related to a few economic conditions, such as 
dependence on primary commodity exports, low national income and slow growth. Conversely, 
he states and astonishingly he adds, objective measures of social grievance such as inequality, a 
lack of democracy and ethnic and religious divisions had had little systematic effect on risk.33  In 
his paper “Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy,” Collier goes 
further to make the case that Civil Wars are principally motivated by economic factors and that 
other claims such as ethnicity, sectarian grievances are merely convenient causes to rally the 
masses around action. He states “Popular perceptions see rebellion as a protest motivated by 
genuine and extreme grievances; rebels are public-spirited heroes fighting against injustice”. 
(Collier, p2)   Economic Analysts see rebellion more as a form of organized crime or, more 
radically, something that is better understood from the distinctive circumstances in which it is 
feasible, rather than worrying about what might motivate its participants. “Popular perceptions 
are shaped by the discourse that conflicts themselves generate. The parties to a civil war do not 
stay silent: they are not white mice observed by scientists. They offer explanations for their 
actions.  Rebel organizations cannot afford to be regarded as criminal because it is neither  
good publicity nor sufficiently motivating. Rebel organizations have to develop a discourse of 
                                                     
33 Collier defines risk as being defined as those factors that could substantially lead to civil war. 
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grievance in order to function.” (Collier, p.7) This is important for us to understand so that we do 
not “misdiagnose” the problem by actually missing the underlying causes.  Criminal rackets for 
example who wrap themselves in the cloak of religious piety, seek to do so to legitimize their 
actions.  Military leaders need not only to think in terms of the “battle space”, but need also to 
think like crime fighters. Understanding and assessing the real motivations of various insurgent 
groups can inform military leaders as to who and what resources to deploy to counter them.  
      Economic theory of conflict argues that the motivation of conflict is essentially found 
more or less in all societies. Why is this really important one may ask? If we look at the current 
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, it may explain quite a lot.  Thomas Barnett the author of “The 
Pentagons New Map: Blueprint for Action” describes the type of social, political and economic 
turmoil that results immediately in societies after military interventions34.   He describes the 
aftermath which creates essentially a vacuum where certain power once resided. He asserts that 
when a society experiences what he calls a system perturbation or in his other words, a “rule set- 
reset”, there is  a scramble among the actors to re-establish rule sets and at the same time a mad 
scramble to be the ones to decide the new rule sets. This results in violent chaos as armed 
competitors battle it out for control of the now vacant leadership positions. The challenge to post 
conflict military managers that local leaders selected by national and international policy makers 
may or may not be accepted by the local population and armed insurgency and chaos results and 
is cannot be effectively controlled by intervention forces. We witnessed this throughout Iraq 
                                                     
34 Barnett is a regular consultant to the US Office of the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations Command, and 
the Joint Forces Command. He was formerly a Senior Researcher at the US Naval War College and Assistant for 
Strategic Futures in the OSD, Office of Force Transformation. Through his research and writings he has assessed, 
analyzed and provided solutions to a number of challenges the US military have encountered in post conflict 
situations. He is also a noted “military futurist” who has advocated changing capabilities and force structures to 
meet current and yet unforeseen conflict settings in the 21st century.  
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particularly in Falluja and Ramadi (the Sunni Triangle) where after the Iraqi Regime military had 
been defeated chaos and violence erupted throughout.  
 
 
 
 
(Source: The Atlantic) 
 
       By establishing and enforcing the new rule sets, one group becomes a dominant power 
and controls resources. Now overlaying Colliers theory on conflict, we can clearly see not only 
the seeds in the past and current insurgency groups and possible motivations but also the seeds 
for future conflict as various internal actors seek to control the one exportable natural resource 
available – oil!.  To make the point that it is largely about economics and not necessarily 
sectarian we need only look to the conflict in Basra in 2007. If we remember, Nouri al Maliki’s35 
                                                     
35  An Iraqi politician who was Prime Minister of Iraq from 2006 to 2014. He is secretary-general of the Islamic 
Dawa Party and is currently the Vice President of Iraq. He and his party are often criticized by the US and other 
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Shi’a government had to violently suppress the Shi’a Fahdila party. Shia on Shia – not sectarian- 
it was about the oil. This is important as policy makers both military and civilian tend to view 
conflict from their own professional prisms. They need not to examine conflict and security in 
the context of conflict and security but rather in the context of everything else.  
      Understand the types of conflict and diagnosing the possible causes before devising 
solutions premised on assumed causes which may possibly cause more harm in transitional 
societies it critical. One must understand that economically motivated violence and the economic 
activities of belligerents may be powerful barriers to war termination.  Groups and individuals 
benefitting from violence, both during conflict and within war torn societies emerging from 
conflict, may have substantial economic interests in preventing the advent of peace, democracy 
and accountability for human rights abuses. There are a number of what I refer to as “Conflict 
Entrepreneurs”36 who actively benefit from and promote violence with a view to maintaining 
instability and insecurity.  They are groups whose motivations are often not transparent and are 
often missed by intervention powers. They come in the form of allies and friends who 
manipulate the uninformed and inexperienced in order to keep the fight going. They engage in 
corruption with host nation participants and work at cross purposes to the post conflict 
practitioner in order to extract as much economic benefit from the conflict as possible. These 
actors must be identified and “managed” within the framework of the overall strategy as they as 
                                                                                                                                         
Western nations as having squandered the hard won peace by disenfranchising the Sunni and Kurdish minority 
populations creating the conditions for instability and most recently the arrival of Islamic State in Western Iraq.  
36 Any group or individual whose profits depend on conditions that promote conflict. Most often used to describe 
those who engage in or directly benefit from illegal economic activity that promotes violence or undermines 
efforts for good governance and economic development. These actors can exist inside or outside of government. 
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are more often than not, powerful official or unofficial informal leaders and influences within the 
society.  
Rule of Law and Its Importance in Building the Foundation of a New Society 
 
A key theme that underwrites much of the published works has to do with the Rule of Law.37  It 
is more or less universally understood that establishing the Rule of Law in post conflict, 
transitioning societies is one if not the critical undertaking that must be done early on in order to 
create and enabling environment to foster other objectives.  Establishing the Rule of Law and 
understanding how to manage the development and implementation of Rule of Law programs is 
critical.  
      What now is the role of the Rule of Law?  What does it mean and how important is it? 
How important is Security Sector Reform in the priority of efforts in post conflict state? I 
personally think this is the existential question. Few among us would disagree that security is 
that which enables all else. Security Sector Reform is more than just reforming the police and 
army.  
       As I discussed earlier good governance requires a functioning government to deliver 
political goods. One of the most important or indeed enabling good is that of security and Rule of 
Law. Neil Kritz, the Associate Vice President of the Institute of Peace and their Rule of Law 
Program Director says that because of the changed nature of war at the beginning of the 21st 
                                                     
37 Rule of Law reform is a term that covers a range of initiatives and projects which cover the spectrum of those 
state institutions that hold and wield power. They include but are not limited to the judiciary, police and army. 
Rule of Law reform is based on the overarching assumption that by creating a functioning legal and security system 
the preconditions for greater objectives such as economic development, democratization, reduction of poverty, 
and peace-building are created 
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century a fresh perspective on the methods of managing conflict on the one hand and of making 
and maintaining peace on the other is urgently needed.  He states that: 
     “Today the overwhelming majority of wars around the world are intra-national rather than 
international. Wars fought between the military forces of two sovereign countries are 
increasingly the exception to the norm. Instead, ethnic and religious conflicts, dispute over self-
determination or secession, and violent power struggles between opposing domestic factions 
account for 93% of the major armed conflicts recorded in the recent years worldwide. In 2004 in 
fact all nineteen major armed conflicts were intrastate.  This statistic has profound ramifications 
for the processes of conflict prevention, conflict resolution, post-conflict resolution, and post-
conflict peace-building. The element that assumes far greater importance in this changed context 
of war is the development of the Rule of Law.” (Crocker, et al p. 401) 
      The Rule of Law has a much broader meaning than merely establishing legal rule sets but 
rather involves the institutions and process that best facilitates authentic stability through justice.  
Institutions in this case matter and we should fully understand their importance in state building.  
According to Kritz, the Rule of Law establishes rules and procedures that constrain the power of 
all parties, hold all parties accountable for their actions, and prohibit the accumulation of 
autocratic or oligarchic power. It also provides a variety of means for the nonviolent resolution 
of disputes, whether between private individuals or between various actors and the government.  
In other words and in short security sector reform requires a body of laws that can path back to 
an definable origin such as a constitution, a court system robust enough to manage the full range 
of court cases both civil and governmental and institutions that carry the credibility and weight 
of moral authority to adequately carry out justice.   Security Sector reform in post conflict 
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societies present particular challenges to provisional governments, occupying forces and 
coalitions. It requires engaging both the personnel of the justice system and the general public 
over an extended period. It also requires recognition that serious Rule of Law reform will 
impinge on the interests of various powerful groups in the postwar setting; this may include 
warlords, organized crime syndicates, tribal elders and other unofficial authority structures that 
will be affected by a transition to a more robust, transparent, and non-discriminatory system of 
justice.  
       Students of Conflict Management should understand all elements of the establishment of 
the Rule of Law or governance. These include drafting a constitution, reconciling war crimes and 
other abuses, cleansing the structures of government and establishing a professional bureaucracy.  
No small feats as we have learned over the last seven years.  Leaders who understand these 
challenges  and are prepared to anticipate them will perform more effectively in the inter-agency 
effort. 
     Overall, new challenges to peace require new tools. As war in all parts of the world are 
changing and becoming intra national, establishing to Rule of Law plays an increasingly critical 
role, particularly in the immediate post conflict construction of peace 
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CHAPTER 5: CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE  
“It must be considered that there is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful    
of success, nor more dangerous to handle, that to initiate a new order of things.” 
    {Nicolo Machiavelli} 
 
     Recent scholarship on civil war and post conflict has focused largely on examining the 
transnational effects on civil conflict.  This research that has been the product of over a decade of 
academic as well as field research focuses on the inherent external-internal links in international 
affairs- interactions between global-to-local and state-to-non-state actors. This new research 
dimension explores how these interactions shape civil war outcomes through the study of 
security sector reform (SSR) programs, this body of work fits within broader theoretical 
endeavor to explain transnational interactions as they relate to conflicts. As a central element of 
postwar peace and state building interventions, SSR is a tool of influence by design and in 
application. SSR programs are comprised of  a series of  interactions between state, non-state 
(such as NGOs and relief organizations), foreign interveners and local actors. (Checkel 2013, 4)  
SSR is a policy tool clearly in  need of sharpening. State and international policymakers require 
better knowledge of which strategies of influence work in different circumstances and what to 
extent this is understood by policy makers and in particular military leaders, this knowledge 
gained through study could end up in better program design and implementation. Professionals in 
the area of conflict studies stand to benefit with a more nuanced appreciation for influencing 
change with foreign partners as well as having a broader understanding of the cultural context in 
which they are attempting to construct programs.  
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      The goal of presented works is building rather than testing theory. They do not advance 
specific hypotheses but rather discuss and analyze in specific detail elements of post conflict 
theory using case studies to highlight lessons learned, point to possible solutions or illuminate 
subjects areas that have confounded post conflict practitioners for well over a decade.  The works 
are unique in the sense that I was academically trained in international affairs, international 
criminal law, international economics and classical international relations theory.  
    Taking these widely accepted tenets, I then applied them to real world situations where I 
observed the interaction of those factors described in the works.  I provide in each of the works 
an honest and objective observation and analysis of the issues using a systems analysis 
framework. In addition, I seek to contribute an in-depth analysis based on diligent research, a 
diagnosis of the problems that ends with concrete, actionable recommendations for future 
engagement.  To date most literature surrounding this new area of study has been largely written 
by academics with little or no practical experience with in the field.   
      The works presented them coming in the form of reports, position papers and briefings to 
leaders and  provide a rare contribution to the field.  Many of the practical recommendations, 
whether they be additions to Professional Military Curriculum, the reorganization of intelligence 
gathering, analysis and dissemination or simply providing the starting point for future research so 
that practitioners save valuable time and money, I believe to be cutting edge.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS 
 
      The End of the Cold War has found the United States and the International Community 
intervening in societies emerging from conflict.  Interventions in Somalia, Haiti, Cambodia, 
Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leonne , Liberia , The Democratic Republic of Congo, Afghanistan and 
Iraq.  None of these could be considered complete successes. Daniel Serwer, VP of the Center of 
Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations and the Center of Innovation at the US Institute of 
Peace, describes “Peacefare” in his work “A Framework for Success” as not as developed as 
warfare.  
Military organizations worldwide organize, plan, train and fight with clearly established 
objectives, doctrine, and even internationally established laws of war. But once major fighting 
ends and what the US military calls stability operations begin, the civil and  their military 
counterparts operate without common doctrine, shared frameworks for planning or joint training. 
Just as military forces systematically plan and train, so too “should military and civilians who 
undertake an international intervention.” (Serwer p.369) 
      The number and variety of international players involved in an intervention is nothing 
less than bewildering.  A typical intervention might include officials and diplomats of numerous 
foreign governments and intergovernmental organizations such as the UN, The World Bank and 
World Health Organizations, regional organizations such as the African Union and the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation Europe well known nongovernmental organizations 
such as Mercy Corps, World Vision and Medecins San Frontier and hundreds of private sector 
employees, including contractors and Armed Private Security Contractors (APSC). How to 
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manage this vast array of often competing organizations with different doctrine, operational 
priorities and in some instances, even antipathy toward one another is of paramount importance.  
We have seen how valuable time, money and most importantly, credibility is squandered as these 
element of the post conflict management team flounder.  
      In 2005, the DoD (Department of Defense) issued DoD 2000.5 putting stability 
operations on an equal footing with war fighting as a military core function.  As a result, the key 
US government agencies are now tasked with giving stability operations the priority and 
attention they deserve.  This is yet to be done on the civilian side. The State Department Officer 
of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization is making progress but does not have the 
personnel or resources required to lead the US contribution to extraordinary complex and 
challenging operations.  I would contend that while we have a DoD Directive we have yet to 
develop a fuller understanding or agreement of the roles and missions of the various departments 
in stability operations or state building. There are many who still believe that we are developing 
permanent solutions to temporary problems and that we are developing or focusing these 
operations at the expense of our ability to conduct Major Combat Operations.  
      Other countries and inter-governmental organizations are developing their civilian 
capacities. The UN in addition to enhancing the capabilities of its Secretariat is mobilizing a 
Peace building Commission that will eventually oversee international interventions in the later 
states.  The World Bank and other specialized UN agencies are likewise building up their 
stabilization and reconstruction capabilities.  Military leaders must understand the roles and 
missions of the World Bank and its insurance arm MIGA and their importance to economic 
development in post-conflict. 
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I would like to conclude with a few thoughts and reflections. I have attempted to focus on 
the importance of having a full and nuanced understanding of conflict and all of its dimensions in 
my published works. The military have more or less been trained and in fact acculturated to view 
not only the military but our specific services in context of what we traditionally. They have not 
however been sufficiently guided as to how we collectively can bring non-traditional effects to 
the post conflict “battle space” using those very same traditional tools. While we may continue to 
use these traditional tools, we need to develop new ways of viewing conflict and society and 
develop new mental maps. What I mean by that is we have to develop imaginative and 
innovative  ways to approach the new and unfamiliar environments we find ourselves in.  
Crocker aptly put it this way:  
“ It matters whether working with partners and key security institutions such as NATO 
and the UN – the US is able to fix and isolate the direct security challenges  and has the energy 
and the constructive optimism to sustain its long standing engagement in the search for a more 
peaceful and less threatening world or the less desirable scenario where the US policies come to 
be viewed as exacerbating tension and undercutting US influence that triggers a contrasting 
mood of isolation, retrenchment and reduced focus on a narrower, defensive agenda that 
tolerates or ignores foreign conflict in order to address direct threats.” (Crocker et al).  
In other words as Barnett asserts: “…we can create a future worth having” marshaling the 
resources and political will to do so or simply pull back and react to those threats that are aimed 
at us directly that pose no risk to political actors? 
      Policy-makers and practitioners should all consider and seriously reflect on what has 
been outlined in this chapter in order to fully think through today’s conflict challenges.  These 
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themes point to a new kind of strategic political resource in international relations which is the 
featured role of “smart power” which engages the multiple assets and instrument of official and 
nonofficial diplomacy and military power. Smart power involves the strategic use of diplomacy, 
persuasion, capacity building and the projection of power in ways that are cost-effective and 
have political and social legitimacy.  Finally, peacemaking and conflict management are central 
for a less divided – less conflicted world. It will be up to the 21st Century Warrior Diplomats to 
be educationally armed to wage the peace.  
Winston Churchill once said, “Victory deserves a future”. Winning wars as Churchill 
knew never served the end.  Winning requires winning the peace as well. Winning the peace is 
the after battle effort to protect and defend the liberty secured in conflict.  Today’s leaders need 
to have a total strategy to manage the post-conflict stage which is arguable the most prolonged 
stage of any conflict. Securing the peace it appears is twice as difficult and takes twice as long as 
“winning” the war. This may also add a new concept to the linear study of war and stages and 
phases and terminations which have become more opaque in today’s conflicts. This provides 
ample fodder for further strategic study to manage post conflict.  
    Accordingly, the aim of this body of research, which has been a longitudinal research 
endeavor extending more than decade has led to some solid concluding observations that inform 
the model  I have devised and introduced earlier in the work. That is that there are a set of 
common elements or “pillars” which comprise of nearly every society whether East or West, 
Muslim, Christian or Socialist and they are essential in some form to the successful functioning 
of a modern or evening developing society; these are legal institutions, police services, the 
military, social institutions and a coherent and credible central government.  The construction of 
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this institutional framework on a national basis can be done.  It must be done however after a 
deep and abiding understanding by policy makers of the Culture, History and Religion of the 
people they are developing policies for and how much they inform not only their national point 
of view but also their individual mental maps. Knowing this will allow policy makers and 
program development specialists devise organizations, institutions and program that will be 
embraced by the people as they give respect to and are informed by those critical elements.  
Friederich Nietchze once referred to the convenient national memory of a people that can be 
used to influence populations through actual history or indeed folklore. These are very powerful 
cultural tools and need to be heeded if not managed in a way.  In modern conflicts we see 
“grievance politics” turn into “grudge wars”. This happens because those in power can 
manipulate the national conscience and memory to their own ends.  In just that same way post-
conflict planners and practitioners must not only have a nuanced understanding and even indeed 
strong sense of history, religion and culture when developing and implementing policies in post 
conflict, complex and dynamic systems, the must be able to apply these lesson by, with and 
through in nearly every aspect of what they do on a daily basis with their host-nation 
counterparts.  
     In conclusion, to that end, the Kleponis Systems Model approach has application across 
the broad spectrum of activities that include Security Sector Reform, Rule of Law Program 
Development and Institution Building. It is my conclusion based on years of study and 
observation that this simple approach will make the difference in setting realistic expectations 
with not only ourselves but those of our host nation counterparts, developing realistic programs 
that take into account cultural reference points and produce outcomes that are both suitable to the 
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international community and host nation stakeholders.  The object is to blend both internationally 
accepted norms with local values, traditions and capabilities. There is a well-known old saying  
that the definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over expecting a different 
outcome.  My empirical research has demonstrated to me that the same methodologies have been 
applied by different cohorts of post conflict professionals over the past decade with poor results 
yet no real change in the approaches to challenges or modus operandi. Perhaps now it is time to 
take a fresh look toward bridging these strategic gaps and take a new approach to Post-Conflict 
Management.  
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